The story so far:
The Delhi High Court, in its recent ruling, has laid down the principles governing the right to be forgotten. The court has evolved a new jurisprudence to protect the privacy of those who continue to be victimised on account of their digital footprints on social media and elsewhere, despite having those matters settled in their favour.
The “right to be forgotten” is the right to have information erased or de-indexed from the public digital environment when its continued accessibility is harmful and serves no public interest.
The concept came to the fore in 2014, when a Spanish citizen, Mario Costeja González, complained to the European Court of Justice that Google continued to display an old newspaper notice about the auction of his repossessed house even though the debt had been settled. The court ruled in his favour, laying the groundwork for the right to erasure, which was later incorporated into Article 17 of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
The Supreme Court’s judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) held that privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21, including the right to informational privacy. In the years that followed, however, High Courts adopted divergent approaches.
While some permitted anonymisation in limited cases, such as the Delhi High Court ordering the masking of names in certain matrimonial and criminal matters, others rejected similar requests on grounds of open justice.
The real challenge was the lack of a coherent framework to balance these competing interests, which the May 2026 Delhi High Court judgment sought to address.
On May 29, the Delhi High Court ruled in a batch of over 30 consolidated petitions, led by Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v. Union of India. The core issue was whether informational privacy could justify the de-indexing or masking of judicial records in a system committed to open justice. The court held that the right to be forgotten flows from Article 21’s guarantee of dignity and informational privacy. The structured proportionality test is that retention must have a legitimate purpose, that the harm to privacy must be balanced against the public interest, and that the least intrusive means, typically by masking names instead of deleting the entire judgment, should be preferred. The court also prescribed a two-week deadline for legal databases to comply and explained that only the parties’ names should be redacted, not the facts of the case.
This is not a stand-alone right. It frequently conflicts with freedom of speech and press under Article 19(1)(a), the principle of open justice, and the public’s right to know. A right to privacy must be sacrificed when the public interest is of a high order, particularly in serious cases of crime, but the digital presence should not destroy a person’s life long after the trial ends. The judgments are still publicly accessible by case number or a keyword search; only name-based searches are restricted.
The toughest aspect is enforcement. An acquittal judgment may still appear highly in name-based searches even after a court has ordered the removal of the search results. Search engines are designed so that the original accusation, or the “shadow of crime,” is often the first thing the user sees. De-indexing can benefit at the search level, but it won’t prevent mirrors, archive copies, or social media sharing. Without effective technical compliance and coordination among platforms, the right may remain largely symbolic.
As of now, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, offers a limited statutory right to erasure in section 12. It is primarily based on consent and does not explicitly address judicial records and public archives, where the right to be forgotten is most needed. The Act is deficient because rules have not been notified and the data protection board has not been completely effective.
The challenge lies in balancing efficiency with accountability. Requiring every request to be decided by a court would create significant bottlenecks, while leaving such decisions entirely to technology companies raises concerns about due process and transparency. A more sensible approach would be a tiered system, where cases could be heard by platforms, contested ones by the data protection board, and judicial cases by courts.
The Delhi High Court has established an important framework, but until the Supreme Court rules on the matter, establishes a data protection board, and platforms comply with it, this ruling will be mostly declaratory. The conflict over freedom of expression and open justice is a reality. The task ahead is now to establish the institutions that facilitate it.
(G. S. Bajpai is Vice Chancellor at National Law University Delhi. He acknowledges the assistance of Vibhuti Sharma, Academic fellow, NLU Delhi. Views are personal)
Published - July 09, 2026 08:30 am IST